美股为何暴跌，逐句解读监管机构主席年度最“鹰”发言

ct而愈演愈烈财富重新分配的过多等，这又反过来阻碍到经济发展消退的持续性，提极高中央银行接踵而来“零现金流同步进行”约束的仍然性。所以，国家银行不必慎重考虑中央银行的重新分配effect。非典M-肺炎挤压的就其在于，大量社会保障者解散了劳工人一组，临时工参与叛将不断下挫，这使得对外通胀显著高于估了真正失业水准和失业截断。后非典M-肺炎黄金时代，被高于估的通胀和社会保障美国市场的“KM-消退”不同之处带入国家银行解散极为规财政政策的“绊脚石”。

4. Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower growth, and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.

丧失价钱比较稳定还无需一段时间内，这无需我们有力地运用中央银行基本功能，使需欲和用电必须地恒定。为了减少粮食价格，经济发展增速确实在一段时间内内就会持续少于潜在增速。而且，劳工美国市场状况很确实就会不大转变成。现金流的升高、经济发展增速的放激化社会保障美国市场的不济都就会减少粮食价格，但也就会给普通家庭和大M-企业带来一些恐惧。这些都是减少粮食价格幸好的赔偿金。如果不能借助价钱比较稳定，损失就会愈来愈严重。

初审：供不应欲是这两项粮食价格的病因，中央银行才会关键作用于需欲，故才会通过收缩需欲强力粮食价格。巴克利给与了强力粮食价格就会不惜牺牲短期经济发展增长的或许，但阐释这是“两害相管理权取其轻”，即使如此在为后文此后做铺垫。

5. The U.S. economy is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of 2021, which reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession. While the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but it is clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding the supply of available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and high inflation has continued to spread through the economy. While the lower inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month's improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down.

相对于2021年上曾最极高水准的经济发展增速而言——反映了大大行其道挤压后的经济发展在此之后，加拿大经济发展通货膨胀叛将开始显著放缓。虽然最近的经济发展样本；也先于，但在我看来，我们的经济发展此后有所区别着旺盛的动能。劳工美国市场偏爱旺盛，但它只不过是失衡的，对建筑工人的需欲大大超过了可用建筑工人的用电。粮食价格叛将远极高于2%，极高粮食价格叛将此后在经济发展里扩散。尽管7月底粮食价格样本急剧下降了，这令人欣慰，但单个月底的急剧下降还远过剩以使委员就会断言粮食价格的拐点并未出现。

初审：如何才能让FOMC断言粮食价格的拐点并未拟定了？这是量化的应以，只不过，7月底共出底的小幅折返是不满足条件的。个人普遍认为，既要关中有粮食价格的水准，也要关中有结构、时序的轨迹和衰减叛将。

6. We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent meeting in July, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the Summary of Economic Projection's (SEP) range of estimates of where the federal funds rate is projected to settle in the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral are not a place to stop or pause.

我们就会必需一个有限拖垮的财政政策见解，以使粮食价格急剧下减为2%的水准。在7月底的就全体会议上，FOMC将联邦议会基金会现金流的目的列车运行上调至2.25 - 2.5%，这是经济发展得出摘要（SEP）对仍然联邦议会基金会现金流列车运行的推估（中有：即里性现金流列车运行）。迄今的不同之处或许是，粮食价格远极高于2%，且社会保障美国市场极度勾张。所以，还不是终止或暂时中止加息的时候。

初审：加息证明中央银行趋于收勾，但一般而言是过勾（或偏勾），只要FFR少于里性现金流，就可以普遍认为中央银行还始终保持不合理列车运行。可将FOMC季度得出（SEP）当里关于FFR的仍然得出看做里性现金流，2022年6月底的最近得出为2.5%，正数7月底加息后FFR目的列车运行的上限。这假定，9月底加息后，中央银行才从偏松朝向偏勾。非典M-肺炎后来，样本谐波小得多，一个较为普遍的论据普遍认为，对里性现金流的推估存在小得多的数量级，以至于纽约联储都暂时中止对外发布新闻模M-的最近得出结果。实践里，可用加拿大中央银行期内结构来衡量中央银行的松勾层面，常用的基准有：3个月底债券与10年中央银行的期内利差（3M-10Y）、1年中央银行与10年中央银行利差（1Y-10Y）或2年中央银行与10年中央银行利差（2Y-10Y）。三个基准的势头基本一致。3M-10Y与另外两个基准短期确实出现背离，但迟早就会趋近。

7. July's increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy tightens further, it likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases.

7月底是去年第二次加息75个基点，我曾经话说，再来一次不同寻常的大大的的加息确实是有用的。我们过去分之一并未过了休就会期的一半。9月底例就会的提议将不大不同获取的全部样本和迅速演变的期望。在某个时点，随着中央银行的见解再进一步收勾，放缓加息的步伐确实是有用的。

初审：“某个时点”的具体主要不大不同国家银行是否确认粮食价格准备具体地朝着2%目的趋近。国家银行实际上的数据分析人员一般就会给一个得出的粮食价格轨迹，FOMC新成员就会勾密结合社会保障等基本面反馈的得出，反转不同时点有用的中央银行见解。当然，后非典M-肺炎黄金时代得出极为不靠谱，FOMC也不必将这一点慎重考虑进来。

8. Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. Committee participants' most recent individual projections from the June SEP showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent through the end of 2023. Participants will update their projections at the September meeting.

丧失粮食价格比较稳定确实（还）无需在一段时间内内有所区别拖垮的财政政策见解。上曾的经验决心对过早地放松财政政策设想了憎恶警告。6月底的SEP显示，FOMC新成员得出到2023年底联邦议会基金会现金流的里位数略少于4%。FOMC将在9月底的就全体会议上愈来愈新他们的得出。

初审：时是如我在新浪网7月底就全体会议纪要里话说的，国家银行首先是惧怕拖垮过剩，其次才是拖垮不必要。

9. Our monetary policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned about inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In particular, we are drawing on three important lessons.

我们对中央银行的审议和对政府基于我们从上世纪七八十八十年代的极高且不比较稳定的粮食价格以及过去四分之一世纪的高于而比较稳定的粮食价格里对粮食价格的认识。值得阐释的是，我们渗入了三个极为重要决心：

10. The first lesson is that central banks can and should take responsibility for delivering low and stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and others once needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben Bernanke has shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation period.1 Today, we regard these questions as settled. Our responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. It is true that the current high inflation is a global phenomenon, and that many economies around the world face inflation as high or higher than seen here in the United States. It is also true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the United States is the product of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed's tools work principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal Reserve's responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability. There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are committed to doing that job.

第一个决心是，国家银行必须且应该分担起借助高于而比较稳定的粮食价格的职责。回看上曾，在此之当年还无需话说服里央银行家们和其他人给与这两点只不过有些奇怪，但时是如当年任主席本·伯南克所证明的那样，这两个鼓吹在大粮食价格黄金时代都受到了较广的驳斥。现在，这些问对联并未妥善解决了。确保价钱比较稳定，我们责无旁贷。的确，迄今的极高粮食价格是一个世界现象，许多经济发展体都接踵而来着极高粮食价格担忧，有的国家甚至比加拿大还要极高。在我看来，加拿大迄今的极高粮食价格也是旺盛的需欲和受限制的自给自足携手的结果。国家银行的基本功能主要针对粮食价格上涨。但这不就会削减国家银行分担确保价钱比较稳定任务的职责。只不过，我们无需此后做的是激化需欲，使其与用电必须地匹配。我们时是致力此。

初审：对外镇抚美国市场、香港市民，实则建立固执，给小三人来向。

11. The second lesson is that the public's expectations about future inflation can play an important role in setting the path of inflation over time. Today, by many measures, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored. That is broadly true of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of market-based measures as well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with inflation having run well above our goal for some time.

第二个决心是，香港市民对未来粮食价格的意味著可以在粮食价格的未来贯穿方面发挥极为重要关键作用。当下，从许多基准来看，仍然粮食价格意味著的“锚”还在。对普通家庭、大M-企业和得出机构的调查报告，以及基于美国市场的衡量标准，约略都是如此。但这不是自满的理由，粮食价格远极高于我们的目的并未有一段时间内了。

初审：粮食价格意味著在持续极高粮食价格的逐步形成操作过程里至关极为重要。这两项，加拿大的短期粮食价格意味著显著极高于仍然——粮食价格的期内结构是倒挂的，这是国家银行还必须在一定层面上去恒定短期与仍然目的的状况。比较稳定的粮食价格意味著能为中央银行土耳其政府提供愈来愈多跨期最优对政府的空间，即不以短期目的而不惜牺牲里仍然目的。相反，粮食价格意味著越好不比较稳定，锚定粮食价格意味著的价格就越好极高，也就越好要欲货币财政政策土耳其政府对短期的担忧此后毫无疑问愈来愈积极的拥护，而这确实要欲不惜牺牲仍然目的。

12. If the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major shocks, it likely will. Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of high and volatile inflation. During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the anticipation of high inflation became entrenched in the economic decision-making of households and businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to expect it to remain high, and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions. As former Chairman Paul Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in 1979, "Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of inflationary expectations."

如果香港市民意味著粮食价格将在一段时间内内有所区别在高于且比较稳定的水准上，那么，在没有灾难性挤压的上述情况下，实际上述情况很确实也就会如此。幸好的是，对于极高且不比较稳定的粮食价格意味著也就会自我借助。上世纪70八十年代，随着粮食价格的回落，对极高粮食价格的意味著在普通家庭和大M-企业的经济发展对政府里显得大不相同。粮食价格叛将越好极高，人们就越好意味著它还就会有所区别在极都将，他们把这种坚信嵌入在加班费和结算对政府上。时是如当年国家银行任主席史蒂芬•斯托克斯在1979年粮食价格达到全盛期时话说的，“粮食价格在一定层面上是自我该系统的，因此，要就让丧失一个愈来愈比较稳定、生产叛将愈来愈极高的经济发展，不必将一部分精力放在控制粮食价格意味著上。”

初审：粮食价格意味著就会自我借助。货币财政政策土耳其政府之所以关中有粮食价格意味著，状况是它对结算使用暴力的阻碍，包括粮食价格和加班费，以及二者之间的时是该系统关系。当意味著粮食价格居极高不下时，临时工者一般就会要欲愈来愈极高的加班费，或指数化的加班费提议必要，比如与生活价格（Cost-of-Living Adjustment，COLA）挂钩。当大M-企业意味著到基本要素价格存在单线担忧时，就会根据一般而言能力也和货品的需欲价钱弹性的大小为了让将一部分价格转嫁给客户，从而逐步形成“加班费-粮食价格旋转”。这是20世纪70八十年代“大滞胀”逐步形成的极为重要状况。加班费提议的是粮食价格的趋势，而非衰减。“加班费-粮食价格旋转”一旦逐步形成，粮食价格意味著就脱锚了。是货币财政政策土耳其政府最不不愿面对的环境。加班费和粮食价格都是有粘性的，“加班费-粮食价格旋转”的逐步形成有较极高的当年置条件，比如勾张的劳工美国市场、较极高的集体谈判管理权、不合理的中央银行、较极高的里仍然粮食价格意味著等。“大激化”黄金时代以来，美国市场和财政政策制订都习惯了粮食价格意味著比较稳定或存在粮食价格截断的尺度环境，逝去了“加班费-粮食价格旋转”的高风险。直到2022年7月底例就会，FOMC仍然澄清“加班费-粮食价格旋转”是粮食价格的一个病因，当然这也是美国市场的深思熟虑，但不可澄清高风险准备积聚。

13. One useful insight into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its future path is based in the concept of "rational inattention."3 When inflation is persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and incorporate inflation into their economic decisions. When inflation is low and stable, they are freer to focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: "For all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household financial decisions."4

关于实际粮食价格确实就会怎样阻碍人们对其未来贯穿的意味著，一个有用的洞见建立在“信念无视”的定义上。当粮食价格持续极高企时，普通家庭和大M-企业不必密切关中有并将粮食价格扩及他们的经济发展对政府。当粮食价格始终保持高点且比较稳定时，他们可以愈来愈自由人地将中有意力集里在其他地方。当年国家银行任主席艾伦·格林斯潘这样话说:“从实际取向来看，价钱比较稳定假定平均价钱水准的意味著叠加有限地小，有限地平滑，它们不就会现阶段地阻碍大M-企业和普通家庭的金融机构对政府。”

初审：所谓“信念无视”，就是中有意勉强粮食价格的存在，不将其扩及到金融机构、经济发展对政府使用暴力里，例如：不要欲违约不好欲愈来愈极高的粮食价格补偿利叛将，临时工者不要欲愈来愈极高的加班费、大M-企业不指定愈来愈极高的粮食价格等。

14. Of course, inflation has just about everyone's attention right now, which highlights a particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues, the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become entrenched.

当然，迄今却是正当都在关中有粮食价格，这凸显了一种特殊的高风险：极高粮食价格持续的时间越好长，对粮食价格升高的意味著显得愈来愈加大不相同的确实性就越好大。

15. That brings me to the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is done. History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely to increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and price setting. The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed multiple failed attempts to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A lengthy period of very restrictive monetary policy was ultimately needed to stem the high inflation and start the process of getting inflation down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. Our aim is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.

这就引出了我的第三个决心，那就是我们不必坚持下去，直到管理工作进行。上曾证明，随着极高粮食价格在加班费和粮食价格的拟定里显得愈来愈加大不相同，减少粮食价格的社会保障价格确实就会随着时间的延迟增加。上世纪80八十年代初斯托克斯抗病毒粮食价格的成功是在此当年15年多次减少粮食价格的尝试挫败后来频发的。为了遏制极高粮食价格，无需仍然执行极为拖垮的中央银行，以将粮食价格降至高于而比较稳定的水准——这是2021年春季以后的也就是说。我们的目的是通过过去果断的行动来避免这样的结果（仍然实施拖垮财政政策）。

初审：坚定信心，谨防在粮食价格刚刚有点急剧下降的苗头，或者折返的趋势还短命的时候就思考转变拖垮的财政政策见解，以管理权衡社会保障/经济发展增长目的。

16. These lessons are guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are confident the job is done.

这些经验决心在个人兴趣我们使用我们的基本功能来减少粮食价格。我们准备采取有力而迅速的采取措施来恒定需欲，使其必须地与自给自足有所区别一致，并比较稳定粮食价格意味著。我们将此后努力，直到我们断言进行了这项管理工作。

（文章仅都有作者论据。责编邮箱：yanguihua@Jiemian.com。）

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